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THE AIRLINES: DESTINED TO FAIL?
RICHARD D. CUDAHY*
I. INTRODUCTION
A KEY PIECE of wisdom about airline economics may be the
hought that "no mass transportation system in the history of
mankind has been profitable over time."' Perhaps part of the
answer to the current financial crisis of the airline industry lies
in pondering this historical circumstance. With deregulation,
the airlines have been acquiring more and more of the attrib-
utes of mass transit.2 And as they have increasingly become a
form of mass transportation-like Amtrak or the Greyhound
bus-they have increasingly found it difficult to make ends
meet. This Article will explore this interesting general observa-
tion at a later point, but first it must cover some specifics of air-
line economics.
* Senior Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; B.S.,
U.S. Military Academy;J.D., Yale Law School. Judge Cudahy wishes to express his
deep appreciation for research and other assistance by his law clerks, Jody
Madeira, Bradley Klein, Sarah Maguire, and Sara Sternberg, and his secretary,
Pamela Jacob.
I Kevin P. Mitchell, The U.S. Airline Industry Fate, 15 KNOWLEDGE, TECH. & POL'Y
3, 5 (2002). As Brian Cudahy notes, "[i] n recent years it has often been said that
public ownership and operation of transit systems in North America came about
after the Second World War because a downtown-oriented transit industry was no
longer able to earn profits in the face of massive competition from private auto-
mobiles in an increasingly suburbanized environment." BRIANJ. CUDAUB', CASH,
TOKENS AND TRANSFERS: A HISTORY OF URBAN MASS TRANSIT IN NORTH AMERICA
127 (1990). Today, it seems to be generally accepted that "[n]o mass transit sys-
tem in the country earns a profit, and most transportation experts say that a
system is successful if it reaches the 50 percent point." CliffordJ. Levy, The PATH
War: Giuliani's Call for a Fare Increase Provokes Anger and Veiled Threats, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 1995, § 1, at 34.
2 Comparing airlines to mass transit systems is not as peculiar as it may at first
appear; many have urged, in fact, that federal subsidies for long-distance train
travel should mirror those given in the airline industry. See, e.g., Editorial, Keep
the Trains Running, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2002, at A24.
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The airline industry, deregulated in 1978, has been rewriting
the laws of economics ever since its liberation from government
control of entry, routes, rates, and other economic factors. Since
deregulation, airlines have been free to serve whatever cities
pleased them and to charge whatever fares seemed appropriate.
Not only were the fares unrestrained both on the upside and on
the downside, but their internal structure paid no heed to the
principles of non-discrimination. It is a well-worn observation
that passengers seated side-by-side in the tourist cabin could be
paying fares that diverged by ten times or more in amount for
essentially the same transportation.
There was a period, primarily in the 1990s, when business
travelers were protesting bitterly about the high level of fares
and complaining, probably correctly, that the high business
fares were subsidizing the bargain prices available to vacation-
ers.' Whether an appropriate cost relationship existed between
business and leisure uses to justify the fare differential is very
doubtful since fare relationships resulted from a process called
"yield management," which essentially sought to charge not
what was cost-justified but what the traffic would bear.4 Tickets
sold immediately before flight time were presumably for busi-
ness users, and their prices were set at estimated levels that busi-
nesses could absorb without extreme protest because it was
assumed that business demand was quite inelastic.5 On the
other hand, non-refundable tickets sold with advance purchase
requirements and Saturday overnight stay requirements were
presumed to be for planned leisure travel (where demand was
very elastic).6 The price of these tickets was set with leisure
travel use in mind and with the ultimate purpose of filling all
the seats on the airplane. The yield management process may
be viewed as a form of Ramsey pricing, where the very low mar-
ginal cost of air travel was reflected in the price of cheap tickets,
3 Eric Torbenson, Travel Budgets Get Clipped: More Local and National Businesses
are Spending Less on Travel-And That's Bad News for the Airlines, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, May 20, 1999, at lB.
4 Stephan P. Brady & William A. Cunningham, Exploring Predatory Pricing in the
Airline Industry, 41 TRANSP. J. 5, 10-11 (2001) (describing yield management);
Ivan L. Pitt &John R. Norsworthy, Economics of the U.S. Commercial Airline Industry:
Productivity, Technology & Deregulation, 8 TRANsp. RESEARCH, ECON. & POL'Y 1,
86-88 (1999).
5 Rose M. Rubin & Justin N. Joy, Where are the Airlines Headed? Implications of
Airline Industry Structure and Change for Consumers, 39J. OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 215,
222-23 (2005).
6 Id.
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for which leisure-traveler demand was highly elastic, but total
costs had to be recovered from the sale of higher-priced tickets
to business travelers with inelastic demand.7
One of the great innovations of the "legacy," full-cost carriers
to meet the competition of low-cost competitors, was to provide
enough deeply discounted tickets to attract passengers who
would otherwise be lost to low-cost competition, while providing
enough full-price tickets for business passengers willing and able
to pay the higher prices.' Various large business customers, in-
cluding the largest-the U.S. Government-were able to negoti-
ate some concessions from absolutely top prices for themselves
with different airlinesY But essentially, the process of ratemak-
ing amounted to charging at the top end what the traffic would
bear and at the bottom end what would fill the aircraft's seats.
This process, as previously noted, is called "yield management."
The high-cost carriers could succeed in competition with the
low-cost carriers because, although those airlines generally had
uniformly low prices, business travelers did not use them much.
This is how the system was supposed to work, but in the period
after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the legacy carriers seem
to have lost the power to price differentially in a way adequate to
sustain revenues while filling all the available seats."0
Business travelers, guided by their companies, began to desert
the legacy carriers to take advantage of the uniformly low fares
charged by the low-cost airlines and to use the discounted ad-
vance purchase and non-refundable fares offered by the legacy
carriers." Video conferencing also played a role in corporate
7 Brady & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 10-11 ("Ramsey pricing involves vary-
ing a rate or a fare charged for a ticket based on the elasticity of demand for that
ticket in relation to the marginal cost of providing that ticket.").
s See Pitt & Norsworthy, supra note 4, at 86-88.
9 Edwin McDowell, Business Travel: Road Warriors Losing Options; Corporate Ire
Rises Along With Business Air Fares, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1998, at D1 (stating that
companies negotiate bulk discounts and lower air fares). See also Adam Bryant,
For Business Air Fares, the Sky's the Limit, N.Y. TIMES, March 14, 1997, at Al (stating
that companies negotiate discounts in return for guaranteed business for
airlines).
1o See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 6-8.
11 See, e.g., Mary Ellen Podmolik, United, American See Drop in Profits: Weaker De-
mand for Business Fares, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 22, 1999, at 52 (observing that busi-
ness travelers were switching to low-cost airlines and advance-purchase tickets);
Chris Woodyard, More Companies Fly with Discount Airlines: Smaller Carriers Offer In-
centives, Cheaper Fares, USA TODAY, July 19, 1999, at IB; Sandra Jones, Business
Travelers are Paying the Price, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 10, 1999, at 53 (noting that
business travelers were switching to advance-purchase and non-refundable fares).
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efforts to contain travel costs. 12 These and other factors forced
the legacies to reduce their business fares, thereby putting pres-
sure on a major source of their revenues. 13 As this Article is
written, the financial condition of the well-established (legacy)
airlines is dire, while that of several of the low-cost, start-up air-
lines is quite healthy. 4 Four out of six of the largest airlines
have recently sought bankruptcy protection, and it would be dif-
ficult to undertake much air travel without flying on a bankrupt
line.15 Current commentary about the industry emphasizes the
12 See, e.g., Torbenson, supra note 3 (explaining that businesses were pre-plan-
ning trips to take advantage of advance-purchase fares and replacing trips with
video conferencing); Edwin McDowell, Companies Put Brakes on Their Travel Budg-
ets, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, June 1, 1998, at 22 (observing that companies were
replacing trips with video conferences).
13 Micheline Maynard, Delta Fare Plan Turns Industry on Its Head, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 7, 2005, at C1 (explaining that reduced business fares means lower revenue).
14 Micheline Maynard, Coffee, Tea or Job? For Airline Workers, an Uncertain Future,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2004, at CI (observing that well-established airlines struggle
while low-cost airlines are healthy). As an example of the extent to which low-
cost airlines force legacy carriers to reduce business fares, consider Valujet's
planned entry into the Dallas market in 1997, when Atlanta-Dallas fares not re-
quiring a Saturday night stay dropped from $866 to $78, both on Valujet and on
carriers such as Delta and American. When Valujet scuttled its Dallas plans, busi-
ness fares soared again to $866. Christopher McGinnis, Low-Cost Carriers Having
Big Impact on Fare Structure, ATL. J.-CONST., Jan. 13, 1997, at E5. Similarly, South-
west's entry into Hartford dropped Hartford-Nashville round-trip business fares
from $900 to $200 with a seven-day advance purchase. Naedine Joy Hazell, Fares
Drop in Reaction to Southwest's Approach, HARTFORD COURANT, July 21, 1999, at B9.
But see Micheline Maynard, So Southwest Is Mortal After All, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2005, § 3, at 1 (chronicling Southwest's difficulties in the face of rising fuel
prices).
15 United Air Lines entered bankruptcy on December 9, 2002, and exited on
February 1, 2006. N.D. Ill. Nos. 02-48191 and 02-48218, available at http://
www.pd-ual.com/UALRestructVP.html. Northwest Airlines filed on September
14, 2005. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 05-17930-alg, available at http://www.nwa-
restr-ucturing.com/nwajlegalinformation.html. Delta Air Lines also entered
bankruptcy on September 14, 2005. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 05-17923-pcb, available at
http://www. delta docket. com / delta _ courtfiledDocuments / delta _ voluntary
Petitions.html. Delta's bankruptcy includes its subsidiary ComAir. American
Trans Air, or ATA, entered bankruptcy on October 22, 2004. S.D. Ind. Case No.
04-19866-BHL-11m, available at http://www.bmccorp.net/78/geninfo.asp?
qnum=7A51A21AAA1A25A200571481A46&clienlD=78. Aloha Airlines entered
bankruptcy on December 30, 2004 D. Hi. Case No. 04-03063, available at http'//
schedule.bsillc.com/aloha/petition% 2004-02063%20AIoha%2OAirgroup.pdf?f=
downloads&s=l&e=l&x=38&c=select. US Airways entered bankruptcy twice:
once on August 11, 2002, and again on September 12, 2004. E.D. Va Case No.
02-83984, available at http://news.findlaw.comhdocs/docs/usair/usair81102pet
.pdf and 04-13820; E.D. Va. Case No. 04-13819, available at http://www.
donlinrecano.net/dr20l/mwc/04-13820/dkOO0001-0000.pdf. Continental has
been in bankruptcy twice since 1978 but has managed to avoid filing against since
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cost advantage enjoyed by the low-cost airlines and ascribes their
success to their cost structure, which enables them to offer inex-
pensive tickets that their more cost-burdened brethren have to
match-usually at a loss.16
This Article, after dealing with some of the historical circum-
stances that have led the airlines to their current pass, will ex-
plore the dilemma of airline deregulation: on the one hand,
there has been a plethora of charges of predatory conduct in-
volving such matters as "fortress hubs," predatory pricing and
capacity dumping, abuse of computerized reservations systems,
exclusive dealing arrangements, abuse of travel agent commis-
sion overrides, abuse of code-sharing and megacarrier alliances,
but, on the other, the industry as a whole has been unable to
achieve a cumulative net profit over the entire period since the
Wright brothers undertook the first flight at Kitty Hawk. 17 On
the one hand, there have been many serious accusations of ef-
forts to improperly restrain competition, but, on the other,
there has been evidence of what in a perhaps less enlightened
age was called "excessive competition."1 8 Thus, the net earnings
of the airlines, as adjusted for their accumulated deficits since
they began to fly, are zero, or less than zero. There have been
periods of prosperity, but these always have been off-set by peri-
ods of loss. Still, at least during the long period of deregulation,
the air has been filled with accusations of improper efforts to
suppress competition and claims of excessive profits by the ma-
jor carriers. This Article will attempt first to briefly sketch the
history of regulation and deregulation of the airline industry
and to suggest the concepts and expectations that were associ-
ated with both those regimes. Later, it will seek to answer the
questions whether there is too little competition in the airline
September 11. Continental Airlines History 1978 to 1990, http//www.
continental.com/company/history/1978-1990.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2006).
16 Timothy M. Vowles, The Effect of Low Fare Air Carriers on Airfares in the US, 8J.
OF TRANSP. GEOG. 121, 125-28 (2000) [hereinafter Vowles, Effect of Low Fare Cai-
ers]; Timothy M. Vowles, The "Southwest Lffect" in Multi-Airport Regions, 7 J. OF AIR
TRANSPORT MGMr. 251, 251-58 (2001).
17 Air Transport Ass'n of Am., Inc.'s Statement for the Record of the Subcom-
mittee on Aviation Transportation and Infrastructure Committee of the U.S.
House of Representatives Concerning the Financial Condition of the US Airline
Industry (June 3, 2004), available at http://www.house.gov/transportation
aviationO6-03-04/bethuneanderson.pdf.
18 E.g., John R. Meyer & Thomas R. Menzies, Airline Deregulation: Time to Com-
plete the Job, 16 ISSUES IN Sci. & TECH. 24, 27 (1999); Brady & Cunningham, supra
note 4, at 10-11; Stephan A. Vander Kraats, Gaining a Competitive Edge Through
Airline Alliances, 10 COMPETITIVENESS REV. 56, 61-62 (2000).
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industry or too much and whether the industry may ever look
forward to sustained profitability. All this will lead to some ob-
servations about the general context within which, in a long his-
torical perspective, mass transportation (perhaps including the
airlines) may never have been profitable.
II. HOW DID THINGS GET THE WAY THEY ARE?
From 1938 to 1978, the airlines were heavily regulated.' 9 The
principal rationale for regulation was the belief that the industry
was wracked by excessive and destructive competition.2 ° So the
regulatory regime, although it permitted some competition in
strictly limited circumstances, relied heavily on administrative
measures in preference to market forces. Entry, routes, and
fares were the principal subjects of regulation. Routes between
city pairs were awarded by the Civil Aeronautics Board
("CAB") 21 based on many criteria including, of course, the ex-
pected demand for service. An effort was made by the CAB in
some cases to award routes to regional and other secondary car-
riers to strengthen their systems and improve their financial
health.22 Healthy airlines were also expected to provide service
on unprofitable routes. There was a fair amount of direct com-
petition, because more than one airline would have rights to fly
on more heavily traveled routes. Ten "trunk" airlines were certif-
icated (authorized) to fly on major routes, and no new airline
was admitted to this group during the period of regulation. A
number of regional airlines, as feeders to the trunk lines, were
also authorized by the CAB. In addition, commuter lines with
smaller planes also provided service to less traveled
destinations.
19 The airline industry was deregulated in 1978 pursuant to the Airline Der-
egulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended at
49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (2000)).
20 Meyer & Menzies, supra note 18, at 24; see also Pitt & Norsworthy, supra note
4, at 67-96.
21 From 1938 to 1940, the Civil Aeronautics Authority regulated the airline
industry; the Civil Aeronautics Board assumed oversight in 1940. STEVEN A. MOR-
RISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 4 (1995).
22 E.g., New York-Chicago Serv. Case, 22 C.A.B. 973 (1955) (granting Capital Air-
lines application to extend certain routes and to remove operating restrictions on
others because the CAB concluded that Capital could viably compete and would
better serve the public). See also Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the
Civil Aeronautics Board-Opening Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANsP. LJ. 9 1,
112-13 (1979) [hereinafter Dempsey, Rise and Fall].
23 Brady & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 5-6.
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Fares were regulated by the CAB, with the amounts of fares
varying generally in line with distance flown. The regulation of
fares meant generally that competition had to take the form of
efforts at better service. Frequency of flights between various
city pairs was the most significant dimension of service, which
meant that, as competition mounted, airlines would fly more
flights with lighter passenger loads-and thus lower load factors.
A load factor is the percentage of a full load carried on a partic-
ular flight, and the lower the load factor, the less remunerative
the flight.24 Thus, competition sometimes tended to reduce
efficiency.
Competition also took the form of more comfortable seating
or dining service featuring richer and more delicious food.
Competition, however, could not be reflected in lower fares,
and the CAB made every effort to keep fares remunerative and
the airlines profitable (although, as industries go, airline profits
were not extraordinarily high).25 Meanwhile, safety standards
were enforced by the Federal Aviation Administration, and this
regulation was unaffected by the later discontinuance of entry,
route, and fare regulation.26
Economic regulation came to an end with the passage of the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Deregulation of the eco-
nomic aspects of airline operation (public control of entry,
routes, rates, etc.) was complete, and these dimensions of air
travel were left entirely to the market. The transition was so
sweeping that the economic regulatory agency, the CAB, ceased
to exist as of 1985. The move to deregulation was facilitated by
intense academic criticism of regulation primarily on ground of
inefficiency and wastefulness of resources. 7 Also, unregulated
intrastate airline service could be furnished at much lower cost
for the same quality of service as federally regulated airline
service.
The entry of the industry into deregulation was turbulent with
numerous start-up airlines making their appearance, usually of-
fering cheaper prices than the legacy carriers and often chal-
24 Pitt & Norsworthy, supra note 4, at 73-74; MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note
21, at 25-27.
25 Pitt & Norsworthy, supra note 4, at 69-70.
2 Id. at 72-73.
27 Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Finn Strat-
egy, & Public Policy, 4 YALEJ. ON REcG. 393, 393 nn.2-5 (1987).
2006]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
lenging them directly along popular routes. 28 During the 1980s
and shortly thereafter, many new airlines (and a few old ones)
bit the dust. Air Florida, Midway, People Express and Fron-
tier-all showing promise at the outset-were unable to sustain
operations.29 Some more established carriers, like Eastern
(originally one of the so-called Big Four) and Braniff, also went
out of business.3 0 But stalwarts like United, American, and Delta
seemed to be doing reasonably well despite their high cost
structures. 1
The question therefore occurs why, during this earlier period
of deregulation, it was primarily the start-up, low-cost carriers
that were the victims of financial failure. An answer is, of
course, that these airlines had no "franchise" carried over from
the days of regulation and did not operate on a broad geo-
graphic scale. 32 Their business was almost wholly noncommer-
cial travel, and they had few business travelers paying much
higher business fares. Unlike the "legacies," where the cheap
fares were targeted at only a limited category of vacationers, the
fares of start-ups were uniformly low. Most of them had no first-
class service, which appealed to many business travelers. Their
financial resources were limited, and frequently, when they un-
dertook to extend their service to new areas, they were unable to
compete effectively.
Part of the reason for the high casualty rate for new airlines
during this period was the successful efforts of the established
carriers to score competitive points by establishing "fortress
hubs" impervious to incursions by new entrants, by making se-
lective price cuts and expanding service to meet competition, by
establishing and making available to travel agents proprietary
computerized reservations systems ("CRSs") 33  (purportedly
favoring the offerings of the owner of the system)," by code-
28 RIGAS DOGANIS, THE AIRLINE BUSINESS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 60
(2001).
29 Pitt & Norsworthy, supra note 4, at 71, 75-77 (1999).
30 Id. at 76-77.
31 DoGAis, supra note 28, at 71.
32 Id. at 72.
33 CRSs are "computer systems that contain and provide information about
airline schedules, availability, fares, and other services." Cindy R. Alexander &
Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Economics of Regulating Reform: Termination of Airline Com-
puter Reservation System Rules, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 371 (2004).
34 MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 21, at 62 (stating that CRSs can be biased
in two ways, through "display bias," when "the host's flights are listed more prom-
inently than those of other carriers," and "architecture bias," which "often makes
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sharing and megacarrier alliances, and by other techniques
(some allegedly predatory).3 Accusations of predation against
the legacy airlines relied on the theory that they were undercut-
ting the start-ups to put them out of business with a later oppor-
tunity for the big airlines to charge monopoly prices." Efforts
to invoke the antitrust laws against the legacies were generally
unsuccessful. 7 And complaints about the permissive attitude of
the Department of Transportation toward airline mergers prob-
ably came too late. In 1987, however, there was a shift of anti-
trust enforcement to the Department of Justice.
After the September 11 attacks, the casualty epidemic among
airlines seemed to shift from the start-ups to the legacies." As
indicated earlier, as business fares continued to rise, corpora-
tions rebelled and guided employees to the use of low-cost air-
lines or of non-refundable tickets on the legacies, so that the
revenues of legacy carriers, heavily dependent on elevated busi-
ness fares, began to decline."9 U.S. Airways entered bankruptcy
twice, while United sought protection once." Delta and North-
west entered recently. Even American seemed shaky (although
at this writing it remains solvent)." It suddenly became crystal
clear that the lower costs of the start-ups (based in large part on
their less onerous labor contracts) gave them an inherent advan-
it easier for travel agents to obtain information about the host's flights than about
others' flights").
35 DOGANIS, supra note 28, at 72; Paul Stephen Dempsey, Predation, Cornpetition
&Antitrust Law: Turbulencein the Airline Industry, 67J. AIR L. & COM. 685, 692-702
(2002) [hereinafter Dempsey, Predation].
36 See United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1173-74 (D. Kan.
2001) (describing American Airlines' response to new entry by a low-cost carrier
as incurring short-term losses by price matching and capacity increases. Once
the low-cost carrier left the market, American would cut capacity and raise fares
to supra-competitive rates to recoup its short-term losses).
'1 Id. at 1195-96. Antitrust liability against the legacy carriers on the theory of
predatory pricing is rarely established because of the difficult, of proving a car-
rier practiced below-cost pricing and recotipment. The district court granted
AMR Corp.'s motion for summaryjudgment because the government could not
establish that AMR's alleged predatory pricing was below cost or that American
was able to recoup any of there short-term losses.
38 Nancy S. Abramowitz, Flying on Empty?: Airlines, Pensions, and Disappointments,
1 Bus. L. BRIEF (Am. U.) 21, 21 (2005) (stating that legacy carriers, as opposed to
low-cost carriers, have been dissolved or absorbed by others in bankruptcy or
"merely flirted off and on" with bankruptcy).
39 See supra note 15. Continental, which has fallen into bankruptcy twice in its
history, has managed to survive thus far.
40 Abramowitz, supra note 38, at 21.
41 Mark Skertic, Flight Paths Diverge: United and American Take Sharply Diferent
Tacks as They Try to Return to Profitability, CtI. TRiB., June 26, 2005, at Cl.
20061
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tage that threatened to push the established part of the industry
into bankruptcy.4 2 The industry solvency problems were greatly
exacerbated by the dizzying rise in the price of oil and corre-
spondingly of aviation fuel and by the imposition of heavy secur-
ity costs after September 11. Fuel is a cost input even exceeding
labor in impact, and bankruptcy provides no escape from this
category of cost nor from the elements of security costs not as-
sumed by the government. Nevertheless, operating successfully
in this season of adversity was the former intrastate carrier,
Southwest, which had union contracts but apparently not oner-
ous work rules. Southwest could, therefore, claim low labor
costs and had apparently hedged against rising fuel costs.
Although the economic aspects of airline activity are no
longer regulated, the cost environment within which various air-
lines operate is subject to modification under the Bankruptcy
Code. 43 As the financial condition of an airline deteriorates, it
becomes a candidate for reorganization under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code.44 Once in Chapter 11, the airline may
take advantage of various provisions of the Code permitting re-
jection of certain executory contracts that impose financial obli-
gations.45 The most significant of these contracts are collective
bargaining agreements with the unions representing its employ-
ees.46 United Airlines, which was in bankruptcy for several years,
took the opportunity to renegotiate on several occasions wage
and benefit concessions with various groups of employees, like
pilots, mechanics, and flight attendants. 47 United has also been
42 Id. (noting that 162 domestic carriers declared bankruptcy since airline der-
egulation; nearly all failed).
43 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2005).
44 Id. at §§ 1101-74. Chapter 11 permits airlines, like other businesses in finan-
cial turmoil, to restructure their finances while continuing to operate. CHARLES
JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 5-6 (1997).
45 11 U.S.C. § 365 allows the trustee or debtor in possession to assume or reject
executory contracts or unexpired leases. Jeffrey S. Heuer & Musette H. Vogel,
Airlines in the Wake of Deregulation: Bankruptcy as an Alternative to Economic Deregula-
tion, 19 TRANSP. L.J. 247, 258 n.57 (1991).
46 Id. at 273 ("Generally, labor costs are both the single largest variable cost
(between airlines) and the largest cost factor.") (footnote omitted). On labor
issues, airlines are subject to 11 U.S.C. § 1113, allowing a debtor to secure the
bankruptcy court's approval for an interim or permanent rejection of CBAs.
47 See Micheline Maynard, Agreements Reached With United, Averting a Strike, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 2005, at C2 (stating that United reached agreement with Interna-
tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers; other unions, including
the machinists, pilots, and flight attendants, had previously granted the airline
$1.5 billion in concessions so that it could emerge from Chapter 11); Micheline
Maynard, For Airlines, A Long Argumentative Summer, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2004, at
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successful in shedding its pension liabilities through securing
their takeover by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC).4" Other airlines have also succeeded in eliminating
their obligations either while in bankruptcy4 "' or through negoti-
ations to avoid bankruptcy." ' As indicated, wage and benefit
concessions by labor constitute the largest items of relief availa-
ble to bankrupt airlines. These concessions, by extending the
life of the failing airlines, tend to perpetuate excess capacity,
and, while serving to rescue the airline and many of its employ-
ees, do little to correct the conditions leading to financial fail-
ure, except to reduce or eliminate the claims against the
enterprise." Of course, labor contracts are the prime targets for
rejection in bankruptcy. 52 To the extent that employee benefits,
including wages, are reduced, employees are being called on to
subsidize the carriers. 53 Governmental subsidies and loan guar-
antees have also been provided to needy airlines through legisla-
tion enacted after September 11.54  These developments are
consistent with viewing the airlines as a species of mass transit
because subsidization is common practice in connection with
C1 (stating that United workers were asked for costs beyond the $2.5 billion per
year they had already accepted); Micheline Maynard, Northwest Chief Says Airline
Will Not Filefor Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2003, at C2 [hereinafter Maynard,
Northwest Chief] (stating that United obtained concessions from employees after
filing for bankruptcy).
48 See, e.g., Micheline Maynard, United Air Wins Right to Default on Its Pensions,
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2005, at Al.
49 See, e.g., Micheline Maynard, US Airways and Unions Agree on Cuts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2002, at C1 (stating that US Airways successfully shed obligations while
in bankruptcy).
50 See, e.g., Micheline Maynard, Delta Reaches Deal With Pilots, Averting Chapter 11
Filing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2004, at Cl (stating that Delta's agreement with pilots'
union cut wage and benefit costs but enabled it to avoid bankruptcy); Maynard,
Northwest Chief, supra note 47 (stating that American received concessions from its
unions by threatening to declare bankruptcy).
51 SeeJohn 1. Gallagher, Jon A. Geier & Margaret H. Spurlin, An Unhappy Cross-
roads: The Interplay of Bankruptcy and Airline Labor Law, SK007 ALI-ABA 679, 708-09
(2004).
52 The Bankruptcy Code prescribes the standards under which a bankrupt air-
line may reject a collective bargaining agreement. 11 U.S.C. § 1113.
53 Labor has attempted to extract promises by airlines to give back these con-
cessions if the airline is ever profitable. To date, these attempts have been unsuc-
cessful. But see Mark Skertic, 1RS Ruling Taxes Plan for United, Airline Fighting Tax
on Notes to Workers CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25, 2005, at Cl.
54 Air Transportation & System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat.
230 (2001). See also Tara Branum & Susanna Dokupil, Security Takeovers and
Bailouts: Aviation and the Return of Big Government, 6 TEX. REv. L. & POL., 431,
475-86 (providing a general discussion of the 2001 government bailout).
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the latter. Subsidies are made available to various species of
mass transportation, including airlines, because of the essential
nature of these services and the dire consequences of their in-
terruption. In its early years, the airline industry was subsidized
through contracts for the carriage of air mail. 55 Bankruptcy pro-
ceedings and how they relate to subsidies will be discussed fur-
ther, later in this Article.
III. AN EVALUATION OF DEREGULATION
At this point, it may be appropriate to examine the advantages
and disadvantages of deregulation. There is general agreement
that deregulation has lowered average fares and, through dis-
counted fares made available to bargain-seeking travelers, made
it possible for a much broader segment of the public to take
advantage of air travel than under regulation. 56 These changes,
of course, have moved air travel closer to mass transportation.
From another perspective, there has been a greater opportunity
under deregulation for airlines to engage in what are arguably
predatory practices (some of which have been noted) such as
discriminatory pricing and the exercise of dominance at hub air-
ports.57 Deregulation has also stimulated merger activity, which,
at least to some degree, has had a depressing effect on competi-
tion.5' But an obvious and troubling consequence of deregula-
tion has also been the seeming inability of the industry to
maintain profitable operations on a sustained basis. Even
55 Pitt & Norsworthy, supra note 4, at 67; Peter C. Carstensen, Evaluating "Der-
egulation" of Commercial Air Travel: False Dichotomization, Untenable Theories, and
Unimplemented Premises, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 109, 110-11 (1989).
56 Brady & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 10 ("Despite many press reports criti-
cal of airline behavior under deregulation, the Department of Transportation
believes that consumers have received much benefit from the advent of deregula-
tion .... consumers can save on an average fare anywhere from 35 to 40 percent
in markets where low-cost carriers operate.")
57 See, e.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1152-54, (D. Kan.
2001) (discussing American Airlines' observation that Delta Airlines lost $232
million in annual revenue by passively allowing Valujet, a low cost carrier, to
make inroads in its Atlanta hub. An American internal memo proclaimed
"[c]learly we don't want this to happen to AA at DFW [American's main hub]."
American believed that its long-term viability required protecting its DFW hub
and its network out of DFW against low cost carriers, and its fare matching and
increased capacity against a low cost carrier's entry was one tactic in maintaining
its hold on DFW).
58 Carstensen, supra note 55, at 135 ("The most important change in airline
structure since 'decontrol' has been the wave of mergers that has increased the
level of concentration in the industry as a whole and created regional monopoly
problems.").
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though the absence of regulation has apparently provided an
opportunity for certain airlines to take undue advantage of a
monopoly position on certain routes, the industry as a whole
and over time has not been able to make money.59 The only
airline to succeed financially on an extended basis has been
Southwest, which has enjoyed low costs, has grown gradually and
prudently, and is now the shining example of what a successful
airline ought to be."'
A preliminary question here should be: does it make any dif-
ference that the airline industry has been chronically unprofita-
ble for as long as memory stretches? The consumer certainly
has not suffered from the low prices that have brought on air-
line deficits. And investment capital has continued to be forth-
coming for airline projects no matter how discouraging the
realistic prospects for making money.6' Somehow, those who
would put their money in airlines have not been discouraged by
the dismal financial history of the industry. Perhaps airline in-
vestors are like people who put money into Broadway shows-
lots of excitement but little financial payoff. This generosity of
investors seems to contradict the laws of economics; under the
generally understood rules of capitalism, a record of profits, or
at least some expectation of them, is a necessary condition to
eliciting investment. But perhaps there is something about the
airlines that has repealed those rules. Perhaps we need not be
concerned, and all the money required to keep potential pas-
sengers content will be forthcoming as a result of some invest-
ment impulse unrelated to the prospect of gain. If this is indeed
the case, a study of airline economics becomes even more en-
lightening because it presents a completely new set of princi-
ples, never before encountered.
59 Since price competition was unleashed by deregulation, the industry has lost
all of the $5.4 billion in cumulative profits it had made prior to 1978 and then
some. Daniel P. Rollman, Comment, Flying Low: Chapter II's Contribution to the
Self-Destructive Nature of Airline Industry Economics, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 381,
383 n. 16 (2004) (citing Edward Wong, Airline Economics: Fasten Your Seat Belt, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at G6).
60 See, e.g., Wong, supra note 59.
6 Scott McCartney, The Middle Seat: It Could Get Even Worse for Airlines, WALI ST.
J., May 17, 2005, at D4 (stating that, despite concessions among airline execu-
tives, the airline industry is "as bad as it ever has been right now," investors,
backed by hedge-fund money, continue to invest in the industry at prices which
analysts consider inflated). Industry analysts' cool reception to the recent US
Airways-American West merger echoes this concern. SeeJerry Knight, US Airways
Investors Live in a Fantasy World, WASH. POST, May 30, 2005, at El.
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Much as one would like to believe that the airlines do not
share the usual obligations of business enterprises and the para-
mount requirement to show a profit, one should assume that a
failure to return something to their investors will in due course
end unhappily, if not disastrously. Perhaps, this assumption is
slavish adherence to the conventional economic wisdom, but it
seems more reasonable to try to explain why airlines are the way
they are while subject to the usual conventions, than attempt to
formulate an entirely new set of conventions. Observing that
money continues to flow to the airlines, one is struck by the al-
most pathetic credulity of investors that can keep hope alive in
the face of an almost universal experience of ultimate failure.
But beyond that, one simply must assume that perpetually losing
money is a bad thing with some unfortunate consequences.
One of these consequences will probably be a decline in levels
of service: the substitution of a pack of pretzels for a decent
meal.62 Additionally, a decline in the quality of equipment will
result: airplanes will be expected to fly longer and farther than
would be the case in more prosperous circumstances. Of
course, less profitable service to smaller centers of population is
bound to be reduced in the interest of reducing costs. 63 How-
ever, the availability of subsidies can cushion these impacts on
the level of service.
Another consequence of straightened financial circumstances
might be the impairment of airline safety. The fact that no fatal
accident has occurred during these years when bankruptcy has
been a common airline condition64 lends credence to the no-
62 Mark Skertic, Fliers Share Stress of a Weary Airline: Traveler's Five-day, 7,836-mile
Odyssey Finds Passengers Adjusting But Missing Way Flying Used to Be, CHI. TRIB., July
31, 2005, at C1;Joe Sharkey, In a Sign of Desperate Times, Many Airlines on Many of
Their Flights Will Serve No Meals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2001, at C6. But see Keith L.
Alexander, As Amenities Disappear, United Bucks Trend, WASH. POST, June 14, 2005,
at D1 (stating that John P. Tague, United's head of marketing, noted that the
airline is "not pulling pillows and blankets off because we're still here to provide
value-added service to the customers" and predicts that "there is a large segment
of customers who value and will pay for what we produce"); Andrea Bennett,
Travel: Loo Skies; Planes Add Bidets, Flowers, But Will Flyers Notice? The No-Thud Toilet
Seat, WALL ST.J., May 13, 2005, at W1 (stating that some airlines are sprucing up
their bathrooms while cutting back on other services).
63 See, e.g., Micheline Maynard, Fears of Isolation as US Airways Cuts Flights, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at Cl; Micheline Maynard, A Nation of Airport Haves and
Have-Nots, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2004, § 3 at 31 [hereinafter Maynard, Airport
Haves and Have-Nots].
64 Sara Kehaulani Goo, Airline Inspections Called Inadequate; FAA Hasn't Kept Up
with Risks Posed by Industry Cost-Cutting Reports Says, WASH. POST, June 9, 2005, at
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tion that the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") regulates
safety with the same ardor in the face of bankruptcy that it dis-
plays when cash flows are satisfactory. However, it hardly seems
likely that safety is not somewhat undermined by the decline in
employee morale inevitably associated with major give-backs and
even loss of company pensions. In addition, financial stringency
has led to increased farming out of maintenance to contractors
(including contractors in foreign countries) .15 This is not neces-
sarily a bad practice leading to a decline in quality of mainte-
nance, but the diffusion of control, inherent in the use of
contractors, may create a potential for problems. 66 Certainly, a
pervasive need to save money is not compatible with an in-
creased emphasis on safety.6 7 At the time of the ValuJet crash in
the Florida Everglades, there was a concern that low-cost opera-
tions implied cutting corners on safety.68 Frankly, the ability of
the airlines to lose money wholesale while maintaining excellent
safety records is amazing, but one should remain skeptical that
this state of affairs can be maintained fully intact over the long
run. Efforts to economize must tend to impair safety in the long
run.
In any event, is it not axiomatic that in a capitalist economy,
net earnings are essential to survival and that the adequacy of
earnings has something to do with the quality of the product or
service provided? If aircraft are to be replaced when worn out,
new employees recruited to replace old ones and an income
stream generated to support the value of equity, the airlines
Al (noting that a large passenger carrier has not been in a fatal accident in over
three years).
65 See, e.g., Susan Carey & Alex Frangos, Airlines, Facing Cost Pressure, Outsource
Crucial Safety Tasks, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2005, at Al.
66 See, e.g., Laura Meckler, Airline Turmoil Poses Safety Issues: Government Report
Says Financial Troubles and Outsourcing of Maintenance Create Risks, IWALL ST. J., June
9, 2005, at D1; Matthew L. Wald, Poor Airplane Maintenance Is Said to Have Led to
Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at A18 (citing that outsourcing maintenance led
to a 2003 Air Midwest crash in Charlotte, N.C., and to the Valujet crash of 1996).
67 See Carstensen, supra note 55, at 128 ("After decontrol of fares and profits,
there were two pressures on investments in safety. First, the funds used for excess
safety investment now could be diverted into profits . . . . Second, competitive
pressures might well drive down total earnings, which would in turn create added
incentives to postpone or minimize any avoidable investment."). But see Bahran
Adrangi, Garland Chow & Kambiz Raffiee, Airline Deregulation, Safety, and Profit-
ability in the U.S., 36 TRANSP. J. 4, 50 (1997) (concluding that the authors' study
showed "[t]he increased financial riskiness of the business has evidently had no
effect on airline safety").
68 Editorial, The Safety of Low-Cost Airlines, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1996, at A20.
2006]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
must have earnings. So, it may be unnecessary to demonstrate
why losing operations cannot rationally be accepted over the
long haul. Agreeing with this premise, one can attempt to ana-
lyze why losses seem so inescapable. And history suggests that
they may be unavoidable. Regulation was introduced in 1938 in
the belief that, without it, excessive and destructive competition
would destroy the potential for successful operations.69 Of
course, in those days the airlines were an infant industry, and
there was a general belief that protection was no longer needed
in 1978, when the regulatory shield was removed y.7  But, since
1978, there have been clear signs that the airline competitors
have encountered great difficulty in dealing with unrestrained
competition. Despite proper and improper efforts to win a de-
gree of control over pricing (that have succeeded in some in-
stances but not enough to swing the balance toward profitable
operations overall), clear symptoms of overcapacity7 2 or under-
pricing 73 continue to be the rule rather than the exception.
IV. THE DILEMMA
After deregulation, the airline industry has faced the twin
problems of, on the one hand, anticompetitive abuses and, on
the other, competition that may be too vigorous or too destruc-
tive, causing almost the entire cadre of legacy airlines to plead
for relief. Of course, the orthodox comment on such a disor-
derly scene is that there is no such thing as excessive competi-
tion. Yes, abuses can impair competition, but there is no such
thing as too much competition. The concept of excessive compe-
69 Meyer & Menzies, supra note 18, at 24 ("The airline industry was originally
regulated out of concern that carriers, left to their own devices, would compete
so intensely that they would set fares too low to generate the profits to reinvest in
new equipment and other capital.").
70 Vowles, Effect of Low Fare Carriers, supra note 16, at 121 ("The supporters of
the [Airline Deregulation Act of 1978] believed that market forces would create
competition between the airlines, which in turn would create lower fares for con-
sumers and a more efficient industry as a whole.").
71 Brady & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 9 ("The high ratio of fixed costs to
variable costs, and the potential for excess capacity, create a situation in which
airlines are willing to sacrifice long-term stability for near-term income. Such a
situation creates a ruinous pricing environment for the airlines.").
72 Id. at 8 ("[A]irlines find themselves in a situation that, when the price is
equal to the minimum average cost, the capacity is greater than the demand.").
73 Id. at 13 ("[I]t has been documented that major carriers do in fact match
lower fares [of new entrants]," citing study showing that "United Airlines set their
fares to match those of Frontier Airlines, and that price put them 30 percent
below their costs .... ").
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tition has not been widely credited since the 1930s. This ortho-
doxy leaves the generally accepted explanation of red ink in air
carrier operations: the failure of most, if not all, airlines can be
attributed to their unwillingness or inability to cut costs to a
level where they can compete with Southwest, Jet Blue, or who-
ever else may come along. Certainly, cost-cutting is an obvious
response to the sort of financial embarrassment that has driven
several leading carriers into the bankruptcy court. The main
consequence of this has been the effort to squeeze labor costs-
obviously at the expense of employees, whose standard of living
has been substantially undercut. Quite apart from issues of fair-
ness, there are real questions whether this kind of draconian
solution can in the long run be in the best interest of the indus-
try. Some observers, of course, see the whole bankruptcy pro-
cess as merely taking back what should never have been given to
labor in the first place. What are being scrapped, however, are
agreements on which both sides thought they could rely. We do
not really know specifically what will be the ultimate outcome of
the industry's "perils of Pauline" existence, but the dangers to
reliable service seem significant, if not dire. Therefore, there
must be questions about the success of free competition in the
airline industry.
The obvious alternative to an uncritical faith in the market is
recourse to heavy-handed regulation to restrain some of the ex-
cesses of competition. At some point, re-regulation may indeed
be sought by the airline industry as the only proven way to rid it
of deficits. Recourse to earlier forms of regulation, however,
raises the specter of all the inefficiencies and misallocations
which characterized the regime in force before 1978.71 It is
hard to imagine that regime, or any close variant of it, not result-
ing in prices far above present discounted levels and far in ex-
cess of what bargain-hunters may have learned to expect in
current circumstances. Regulation, as practiced before 1978, es-
sentially involved government management of an airline cartel
with the allowance of competition only on a carefully measured
basis. One does not have to be a market fanatic to see the
problems with such an inflexible brand of regulation.7 5
74 See Carstensen, supra note 55, at 112 (stating that, by the 1950s, the CAB had
"become a protector of existing airlines by blocking entry, frustrating price com-
petition, and generally setting rates that allowed airlines very good returns").
75 See id. at 11 1 ("[CAB regulation] created the functional equivalent of a pow-
erful and protected industry cartel . .. [p] rices, routes, and other aspects of com-
petition within the CAB's jurisdiction were controlled. ... )
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Are there any measures short of the old style of regulation
that would help to avoid the current problems of the industry?
One can start with what might be the crudest approach: the es-
tablishment of a ceiling on the total number of aircraft in com-
mercial use at any particular time. Such a limitation on supply,
if feasible, would, of course, violate a basic principle of antitrust,
but could help to maintain a more realistic balance between
supply and demand. However, this approach would obviously
run up against the problem of determining how the permissible
aircraft should be allocated among the various carriers and what
provisions should be made for new entrants. In fact, the
problems might be very similar to those encountered in a supply
management program in agriculture, with quotas to determine
how much each farmer can place under cultivation.7 6
This approach, when fully elaborated, might not be much dif-
ferent from the arrangements formerly in effect under the CAB.
However, during the period of regulation, one measure for re-
ducing overcapacity was to allow agreements among airlines to
limit capacity.77 If subject to regulatory surveillance, this might
provide an approach to the overcapacity problem. But before
attempting full, or even partial re-regulation, it might be worth-
while to explore how the apparently destructive impact of naked
price competition could be moderated without recourse to
something encumbered with all the accumulated baggage of
"regulation." After all, price competition in the airline industry
has been so intense that it has persistently driven the industry
into deficit operations, and an attempt might be made to "mod-
erate" competition short of comprehensive regulation.
76 U.S. agricultural economic policies and programs have historically consisted
of supply management programs. See generally Allen H. Olson, Federal Farm Pro-
grams-Past, Present, and Future-Will We Learn From Our Mistakes?, 6 GREAT PtAINS
NAT. RESOURCESJ. 1 (2001). Such an agenda creates certain problems. See THE
McGRAw-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 21-22 (Douglas Greenwald ed., 2d
ed. 1994) ("It is also generally agreed that the [U.S. agricultural economic] poli-
cies and programs in the 1950s and 1960s and again in the 1980s held farm prices
and incomes higher than they otherwise would have been in a short-run con-
text .... [T]he policies and programs were beneficial to the farming sector in
the short run, but the implications for the long run are questionable .... [T]he
general agricultural economic policy of the nation has contributed, and contin-
ues to contribute, to a changed structure of American farming-a structure in
which there are fewer and fewer and larger and larger farms.").
77 Paul S. Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP. L. J. 235, 313
n.737 (2003); Dempsey, Rise and Fall, supra note 22, 117-18 nn.101-08 (discuss-
ing collective reduction of service agreements that airlines entered as a response
to falling load factors).
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V. CAN COMPETITION BE TEMPERED IN THE
INTEREST OF STABILITY?
Certain markets characterized by pure price competition may
be plagued by a problem of competitive intensity,7 8 in which sell-
ers find it difficult to maintain their financial viability. This may
not be fully true of commodity businesses generally although it
is usually the case that people in these businesses are struggling
on a continual basis to differentiate their products in order to
escape the commodity classification, and the airlines' product is
not only a commodity, but a perishable commodity7 9 Some of
the factors that seem to bear on the financial viability of com-
modity producers involve the ease of entry into their businesses,
the transparency of competitive prices, and the apparent ur-
gency of meeting competitive prices. Entry into the airline in-
dustry, although not almost costless as was argued in connection
with the application of contestability theories, is still thought to
be relatively easy.80 And price transparency has been strongly
fortified by competitive information easily accessible on the In-
ternet, which is increasingly the vehicle for obtaining air reserva-
tions in lieu of recourse to travel agents. 81 Airlines and some
similar businesses, where entry is relatively cheap, where there is
apparently nothing unique or recognizably different about the
78 Brady & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 8 ("It is argued that the airline indus-
try can be seen as having an empty core, where there are no core customers who
cannot be taken away by a price competition rival.").
79 Id. at 10 ("Airlines treat their seats as a perishable commodity .... The
[seats] are differentiated by service levels received in flight, and by the willingness
of a customer to accept certain restrictions.").
80 There seems to be a lack of consensus as to whether the airline industry is
characterized by ease of entry. Vietor argues that entry was easier after deregula-
tion, with low sunk costs enhancing contestability, but concludes that the advan-
tages of incumbency, specialized assets, and strategic choices prevailed. Richard
H. K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Airline Regulation and Deregulation, 1925-1988,
64 Bus. HIST. REV. 1 (1990). Levine notes that early deregulation literature hy-
pothesized that entry and exit into the airline industry would be possible without
substantial sunk costs because aircraft were leased, and maintenance and reserva-
tion systems were contracted, while airports and airways were already public. Le-
vine, supra note 27, at 400. But see Andrew R. Goetz, Deregulation, Competition, and
Antitrust Implications in the U.S. Airline Industry, 10J. OF TRANSPORT GEOGRAPHY 1, 4
(2002) (citing study identifying five significant "barriers" new airline entrants
face); Carstensen, supra note 55, at 141 (stating that "new entrants faced substan-
tial costs in making entry into a market, and that existing airlines had many in-
herent advantages over new entrants").
81 Rubin & Joy, supra note 5, at 222 (stating that "the advent of competitive
direct airline ticket sales, on both individual airline and discount travel Web sites,
has revolutionized the marketing and selling of tickets").
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product, and where prices throughout the industry are ex-
tremely transparent, seem to have an urgency about meeting
competition that may lead to prices falling below what is re-
quired to recover costs.8 2 This is a phenomenon that is not part
of the body of orthodox economics but is one that occasionally
pops up where, as indicated, entry is relatively costless, where
the product is purely a commodity and undiluted price competi-
tion is the rule, where prices are wholly transparent, and where
there is an urgency to meet competition, as, for example, in the
airlines and in agriculture. Seventy years of experience with the
airlines, during which there have been no net cumulative earn-
ings, suggest that something is at work beyond poor manage-
ment (although that may be a factor).8"
Currently, there is nothing about an airline flight that raises it
above the level of generic rapid transportation between Point A
and Point B.84 It is, of course, easier to distinguish service be-
tween Point A and Point B (as opposed to individual flights)
from the generic on grounds of frequency or of superior timing.
It is also possible to distinguish service based on a number of
factors, such as type of aircraft used, amount of space between
seats, food and drink provided during flight, and so forth, but
the commercial reality seems to be that price will trump any of
these factors as a basis for choice-in part because these factors
are rarely so telling as to override price. Travel in the coach
section of airplanes is uncomfortable, and the fact that it may be
slightly more uncomfortable on some airlines than in others is
rarely decisive.
One of the marketing devices developed by the industry to
overcome the consequences of its commodity character is the
frequent flier program. This program provides that the more
miles are flown on a particular airline, the more free additional
miles of flight on that airline will be earned. Thus, particularly
for business travelers, who cover tens or hundreds of thousands
of miles annually, there is an opportunity to accumulate enough
82 See Brady & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 8, 10.
83 See Rubin & Joy, supra note 5, at 219 ("The market power characteristics of
price determination, product differentiation, economies of scale, and contestabil-
ity with low-cost competitors indicate that airlines are an inherently unstable in-
dustry-a problem typical of industries with high capital costs.").
84 As Brady and Cunningham state, "[i] t is argued that the airline industry can
be seen as having an empty core, where there are no core customers who cannot
be taken away by a price competitive rival." Brady & Cunningham, supra note 4,
at 8.
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free mileage to enable the traveler to fly domestic and even in-
ternational routes on vacation without cost.15 This is certainly
an incentive to stick with one airline with a generous frequent
flier program and to accumulate free mileage at a relatively high
rate. It may have been frequent flier programs that for a long
time kept business customers of the legacy airlines loyal in spite
of prohibitively high fares. Sometimes, the employers of these
travelers arrogated the bonus miles to themselves-thus provid-
ing the employers with a significant benefit and a good reason
(at least in their own mind) to remain loyal to their chosen leg-
acy carrier."' But gradually the incentive of bonus miles was
overborne by simple considerations of price, and business users
began to abandon the high fares of the legacies in favor of tick-
ets on the low-cost carriers or non-refundable tickets on the leg-
acy carriers. 7 Businesses began to decide that they simply could
no longer afford a high level of air travel. In fact, they began to
promote video conferencing and other electronic substitutes for
travel itself.8" As a result, frequent flier plans lost much of the
effectiveness as a means of stimulating repeat business."9 But in
85 One might even say that frequent flier programs were designed to lure busi-
ness travelers away from discount travel. See Paul Grimes, Mhat's New in the Travel
Indushy, Wooing the Corporate Traveler, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1983, § 3, at 9 ("Appar-
ently acknowledging that most business travelers (or their companies) care more
about basic transportation than frills, American Airlines recently announced that
it was discontinuing extra-fare 'business class' from most domestic flights. The
big pitch, instead, is to entice [business] travelers through frequent-flier bo-
nuses-principally in the form of free travel-for choosing one carrier over
another.")
86 When frequent flier programs were first instituted, many corporations did
not like this bonus since its benefits were designed to accrue to individual trav-
elers, not their employers. See Grimes, supra note 85. But employers first had to
force employees to disclose these details, which proved difficult. Frequent flier
programs were so successful that business travelers often kept mum about travel
plans so as to conceal accumulated perks from their employers. See Agis
Salpukas, Companies Battle Airlines on Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1983, at DI
(stating that corporate travel departments had difficulty persuading employees to
turn in bonus travel points from frequent flier programs).
'7 See Torbenson, supra note 3.
88 See McDowell, supra note 12.
s9 But see Kimon Proussaloglou & Frank Koppelman, Air Carrier Demand, 22
TRANSP. 371 (1995) (finding that air carrier choice was a product of market
presence, schedule convenience, low fare, on time reliability, and frequent flier
programs; in their study, however, frequent flier programs had one of the strong-
est impacts on carrier selection).
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their heyday, frequent flier programs were criticized as being
anticompetitive.9"
Another marketing device aimed at tying potential customers
to one of the legacy carriers and also suspected of anticompeti-
tive potential was the computerized reservations system ("CRS"),
which was widely furnished to travel agents. American Airlines
first entered this field with its Sabre system,91 which provided
travel agents computer listings of flight schedules and fare infor-
mation relating to almost all airlines.92 American Airlines
flights, however, were given prominent treatment, with the ex-
pectation that they would frequently be the choice of the travel
agents on whose premises the CRS was installed.93 United Air
Lines soon followed with its Apollo system,94 which provided a
similar service with similar expectations of providing a boost for
United's business.9 5 A growing number of other airlines also un-
dertook to establish CRSs. This approach was effective enough
90 See Mark N. Cooper, Freeing Public Policy from the Deregulation Debate: The Air-
line Industry Comes of Age (And Should Be Held Accountable for Its Anticompetitive Be-
havior), 13 AIR & SPACE LAW. 1, 24 (1999); see also MORRISON & WINSTON, supra
note 21, at 57.
91 Sabre was created in 1962 by IBM. See THOMAS PETZINGER, JR., HARD IAND-
ING: THE Epic CONTEST FOR POWER AND PROFITS THAT PLUNGED THE AIRLINES INTO
CHAOS 54 (1995).
92 For a detailed discussion of Sabre's history and formulation, see Robert V.
Head, Getting Sabre off the Ground, 24 IEEE ANNALS OF THE HIST. OF COMPUTING 32
(2002).
93 See Douglas B. Feaver, American Airlines Defends Computer System, WASH. POST,
June 3, 1982, at El ("However, American builds what Crandall calls a 'bias' into
the computer program" in which the first set of listed flights on the terminal will
include those with best service, regardless of airline, but American flights that are
within thirty minutes of the desired time will be listed first, even if another flight
is closer in time).
94 Apollo was created in 1971. See Stanley Ziemba, Feds Wonder If All's Fair in the
Air, Critics See Bias in How the Airlines Take Reservations, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 1992, at
C1.
95 See John H. Cushman, Jr., The High-Stakes Battle for Airline Reservations, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 1989, § 3, at 7 (describing architectural bias in Apollo; a travel
agent using Apollo can see up-to-date information on the availability of United
seats and fares but not necessarily for other airlines, and will issue more United
tickets because the Apollo system is designed to make transactions involving
United flights easier than for those of other airlines-a factor known as the "halo
effect"); Dempsey, Predation, supra note 35, at 812 (stating with respect to "upstart
airlines" that "Apollo's display bias against non-code-sharing connecting
flights ... coupled with United's refusal to code-share with upstart airlines, gives
their product offerings inferior shelf space in the vertically integrated market
which United controls").
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to evoke criticism as being anticompetitive," and in due course
some regulatory measures were adopted to eliminate the pre-
sumed discriminatory effect of the CRSs.97 The CRSs, however,
did not seem to be a significant factor when, after September
11, the legacy airlines were sorely battered by competition from
the low-cost operators." The bottom line is that none of the
various marketing devices employed by the legacy airlines to en-
able them to compete successfully in the face of substantially
lower prices has proven to be very effective. In the end, price
always seems to be the dominant consideration. According to
mainstream economists, this is as it should be. But the unal-
loyed dominance of price, in conjunction with the other factors
discussed, has not only driven the airlines toward efficiency but
also in many cases toward bankruptcy. There seems to have
been too much of a good thing-competition.
What may have been needed, and what has always been miss-
ing in the airline industry to help keep financial disaster at bay,
is a strong enough sense of brand preference and brand loyalty
to dilute the impact of persistent and radical price cutting as the
only marketing strategy. The essence of the airlines' competi-
tive problem has been the need to follow the low-price leader
instantaneously or even anticipatorily, with nothing to sustain
sales even in the face of a minor and transitory price disadvan-
tage. A genuine and widely recognized advantage in quality
would, of course, seem to be exactly what is required, but this is
a situation that has rarely prevailed in the airline industry. One
instance of where it has prevailed involves Midwest Express,
which has its hub in Milwaukee and which flies to various impor-
tant destinations throughout the country. This airline has pro-
vided two-abreast seating, with wider seats than are available in
96 See, e.g., Scott McCartney, American Airlines is Accused of Bias With Sabre System,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1996, at A8.
97 See, e.g., id. The CAB began to investigate the CRS industry, in particular
those systems owned by American and United, as early as 1982. Alexander & Lee,
supra note 33, at 381. In the summer of 1982, the Department of Justice em-
paneled a grandjury in Fort Worth to investigate American Airlines' Sabre system
and found that the system produced anticompetitive conditions; it later opened a
similar probe to inquire into United's Apollo system. Douglas B. Feaver, Justice
Steps Up Probe of Airline Ticketing Systems, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1983, at Fl. This
led to overlapping investigations and conflicts of authority, which were ultimately
resolved in favor of the Department of Justice. Douglas B. Feaver, Baxter Asks
CAB to Drop Own Air Ticketing Probe, WASH. PoST, Apr. 21, 1983, at D17. The CAB,
however, outlawed display bias in CRSs in 1984. MORRISON & WINSTON, supra
note 21, at 62.
98 See Torbenson, supra note 3.
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the normal three-abreast situation."9 This was a feature widely
known to potential passengers and widely commented on as an
important benefit by people acquainted with the airline. But
recently, when the whole industry has faltered in the wake of
September 11 and in the face of competition from the low-cost
carriers, even a well-developed and well-known quality advan-
tage like this one, has apparently not been able to offset price as
a determinant of consumer behavior. 100 Of course, low prices
are what competition is supposed to produce, so there may be
impatience with the view that this can be a "problem." The cur-
rent view of the airlines' situation is simply that the legacies
must get their costs down to match the low-cost carriers or go
out of business. Several of the legacy carriers are now in bank-
ruptcy, and several more threaten bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is
now a sort of Purgatory-a waypoint on the road to Heaven,
where petitions of all sorts can relieve aspiring debtors of their
burdens. In the case of the airlines particularly, bankruptcy af-
fords an opportunity to shed bothersome obligations in the in-
terest of becoming competitive. And the obligations to one's
labor force are the most vulnerable, apparently because there
are no alternative bidders for the services of pilots and flight
attendants. There, of course, have been precedents in other in-
dustries for the use of bankruptcy as a weapon against labor.
Meatpacking comes immediately to mind.' In 1984, Wilson
and Company (a large meatpacker) entered bankruptcy and re-
jected its collective bargaining agreement, which purported to
incorporate a wage scale following the industry pattern-that is,
the scale of compensation imposed by the Food and Commer-
cial Workers international union on all, or almost all, significant
members of the industry. The Wilson company then adopted a
wage scale drastically reduced from what had existed before.
99 See Associated Press, Midwest Airlines Aims to Please Thrifty Fliers, CHI. TRIB.,
May 29, 2003, at C10 (commenting on the "signature service's more spacious two-
by-two leather seats").
100 See Melissa Allison, Leisure Suits Midwest Fine in Turnaround; Milwaukee-based
Airline Renowned for Its First-class Treatment of Business Travelers Takes Drastic Steps to
Cope With Big Losses, CHI. Ttui., Mar. 22, 2004, at CN1.
101 Oklahoma-based Wilson Foods, Inc. was financially solvent, with $67 mil-
lion in assets, when it filed for Chapter 11 in 1983, but was losing $1 million each
week largely because of noncompetitive union contracts. In bankruptcy, the cor-
poration unilaterally abrogated union contracts and sharply reduced wages for
union workers before emerging from bankruptcy in 1984. See Warren Brown,
Surviving "Creative" Bankruptcy; As a Business Strategy, Firms Find That It Exacts a
Heavy Price, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1988, at HI.
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This shattered the industry pattern, and from then on members
of the industry negotiated their own contracts establishing levels
of compensation applicable only to them. l"" This was a prece-
dent for much that has followed in the airline industry.""
And nowhere has bankruptcy been used with such persis-
tence, determination, and, flair as in the airlines to change
rather fundamentally the terms under which employees under-
take to render service. The shift of the United Air Lines pen-
sion plan to the back of the government (under much more
modest terms) is the most conspicuous example. The underl-
ing principle of international unionism-that competition
should not be carried on in the terms under which labor is ren-
dered-has been abandoned. That principle was the basis of
the unions' efforts to establish an industry pattern that could be
enforced uniformly in bargaining with all employers in a given
industry. On that basis, all the competitors in an industry would
be faced with the same labor costs, and competition would be
carried on otherwise than at the expense of labor. Of course,
that principle has currently lost much of its significance in the
face of the growing importance of competition's going forward
on a global basis, where there is no wage "pattern." But even in
strictly domestic terms, the Bankruptcy Code has presented a
golden opportunity to employers to carry on competition prima-
rily in the terms that they offer to their employees and to engage
in a running revision of their labor agreements (and "a race to
the bottom"). This process has met with no expressions of out-
rage outside of labor circles except for a newspaper column writ-
ten by a Catholic priest, who has equated the dumping of
pensions to the theft of a worker's wages and as a sin calling out
to Heaven for vengeance.""° Without pursuing the morality of
these matters, it is still the case that the bankruptcy process may
amount to a subsidy to the airlines by their labor force.
Whether the downward revision of the benefits provided by a
collective bargaining agreement is a true "subsidy" is more than
102 See Packinghouse Workers' Report (June 3, 2002), http://wNW.ufcw.net/
files/pdf/packinghouse-workers-reporL2002.pdf; Packinghouse Workers: The Long
March Backwards (October 1, 2004), http://www.reapinc.org/Briefing-Papers/
PackinghouseWorkers(BP6).htm.
103 See George Ruben, Modest Labor-Management Bargains Continue in 1984 De-
spite the Recovey, 108 MONTHLY LXB. REV., 3, 10 (1985) (describing the Wilson
bankruptcy and labor dispute).
104 Andrew Greeley, Editorial, A Society That Permits Such Abuse is a Sick Society,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 27, 2005, at 47.
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a matter of semantics. Because the terms to be revised had once
been voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, they seem to re-
present a proper baseline for evaluating the nature of a change
under the duress of the Bankruptcy Code (even though the lat-
ter may only have recognized the realities of the need for corpo-
rate survival). A subsidy to facilitate corporate survival is
nonetheless a subsidy. There may be objection to use of the
word "subsidy" on the ground that the benefits under the labor
contract were purportedly too generous and agreed to by the
airline under some kind of unspecified duress. The fact is, how-
ever, that the collective bargaining agreement was enforceable
as a contract absent the coercive impact of the Bankruptcy
Code. Under the law, it was a voluntary agreement, and prop-
erly establishes the baseline against which to measure the
changes demanded by the Bankruptcy Code.
VI. ARE THERE SOLUTIONS?
The airlines face a situation where they have been deregu-
lated and committed to the tender mercies of competition.
They have operated in a more or less freely competitive mode
for more than twenty-five years. The competitive regime has
been successful in substantially lowering fares and in opening
the airways to use by much broader segments of the general
public than was formerly the case. There would be little support
for returning to the former regulated regime. There have been
periodic concerns that the legacy airlines have engaged in an-
ticompetitive practices at the expense of the "low-cost" airlines.
On the other hand, at this point the legacies are, without excep-
tion, suffering severe financial problems and seem to be incapa-
ble of competing successfully with the low-cost airlines, at least
without severe reductions in costs mostly achieved under the
Bankruptcy Code. Labor concessions achieved under the Bank-
ruptcy Code are, in effect, subsidies by labor to the airlines,
hopefully enabling them to recover financial stability.
The airlines have attempted, for the most part unsuccessfully,
to differentiate their product so as to build brand loyalty and to
insulate themselves to a degree from pure price competition.
But air travel seems to be a commodity with unusual price trans-
parency provided by the Internet, which furnishes immediate
price comparisons of the cost of requested air travel between
specified points. Whether, for some reason, this, coupled with
comparative ease of entry, leads to "excessive competition" is the
question raised by some observers, even though the concept of
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"excessive competition" is not recognized by mainstream econo-
mists today. In addition, antitrust theory regards competition as
an unqualified good-always to be sought after and never to be
undermined. There is no escaping the fact, however, that,
taken collectively, the airlines have not shown a profit over their
entire history-that is, the profits from the beginning have been
offset by the losses. This is a stubborn fact that must be recog-
nized and addressed.
Perhaps, there is something about the process of establishing
airline prices and of responding to prices set by competitors that
leads to ill-considered pricing below cost. The fixed costs of an
airline flight are so great in relation to the total cost that pricing
at marginal cost, without adequate adjustments to capture total
cost, will bring eventual disaster. In addition, passenger trans-
portation, by air or otherwise, is a perishable commodity. There
is great pressure to earn something for empty seats before their
value disappears on take-off roll. It might be useful to conduct
experiments in pricing procedure to obtain clues about any
changes that might improve the rationality of pricing. One ap-
proach that might conceivably be helpful and might bring more
deliberation to pricing would be to establish a requirement that
public notice of price changes must be filed with a government
agency a specified time before the proposed fare's effective
date. This procedure might have some impact in making pric-
ing more deliberate and more rational although there is no pre-
sent evidence that this is necessarily the case. In any event, this
sort of procedural requirement, or something like it, would pre-
sumably have no fundamental or long-term effect on the price-
setting function of competition but might tend to restrain
whatever it is that leads to underpricing in the competitive mael-
strom of airline yield management. Whether this kind of provi-
sion, or some other similar procedural requirement, would be
helpful can, of course, be determined only by trial and error.10 5
The more fundamental problem-that mass transportation is
intrinsically incapable of yielding a long-term profit-is obvi-
ously more resistant to solutions. 1" If this dictum is in fact valid
1o5 See Carstensen, supra note 55, at 143.
106 Indeed, at times, the potential for mass transit to be profitable was sacri-
ficed for the "public good." New York, for instance, debated in the early years of
the twentieth century whether considerations of profit would triumph over those
of loss; in 1906, as the New York state assembly was confronting this very issue,
the New York Times argued that the "truest test" of any new subway line was "'the
reasonable certainty of profit,"' while the Hearst papers contended that "only
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(and history seems to validate it), its cause may be the force of
the consumer demand for transportation service below cost.
Currently, almost all forms of mass transit are subsidized, from
Amtrak'0 7 to municipal bus service."' 8 Greyhound continues to
operate an intercity bus service on a for-profit basis. °9 Whether
this can be done successfully remains to be seen, and Grey-
hound continues to retrench its service. Greyhound certainly
provides mass transportation, although its customers are drawn
heavily from the lower-income fringe of the population. The
airlines serve a broader spectrum of incomes and, with time,
seem to penetrate lower and lower on the income scale. An-
other indicator of the demand for subsidies in mass travel was
the practice, in socialist economies, to offer mass transportation
at prices far below cost. The author shall always remember pay-
ing three kopecks to ride the Moscow subway in its Red period.
municipal ownership would permit construction of mass transit in advance of
actual need. This "made large issues of public good subservient to the pri-
,,ate good of individual companies ....... See CUDAHY, supra note 1, at 130.
Though the choice between the advantages of private ownership (tied to the
ideal of profitability) and the altruistic benefits of public operation (wedded to
the goal of the public good) was evidently a contentious one, by the mid-twenti-
eth century the public good (still presumably nonprofitable) had won out, and
most city mass transit systems were gathered into the municipal fold. See generally
CUDAHY, supra note 1, at 133-36.
107 Amtrak is the popular term for the National Railroad Passenger Corpora-
tion, a private, for-profit company created by the Rail Passenger Service Act that
in 1971 took over virtually all intercity passenger trains. CUDAHY, supra note 1, at
211. Members of Amtrak's board of directors are appointed by the President,
subject to confirmation by the Senate. After George Warrington became presi-
dent of Amtrak in January, 1998, Amtrak was ordered by the Clinton administra-
tion and by Congress to become self-sufficient within 5 years. SeeJon Hilkevitch,
Amtrak Maps Plan to Lure Riders Back, Renovated Trains Part of Strategy, CHi. TRIB.,
Apr. 28, 2003, at MW 1. The perspective under former president David Gunn
was that no form of mass transportation is self-sufficient. See George F. Will, And
Amtrak Keeps Rolling Along, WASH. POST., June 8, 2003, at B7. Amtrak's board of
directors fired Gunn on November 9, 2005. Keith L. Alexander, Amtrak Fires Presi-
dent Days After Bad Report, Tenure Included Clashes With Bush Administration, WASH.
POST, Nov. 10, 2005, at D1.
108 Subsidization is actually built into the structure of publicly managed mass
transit. From the end of the Second World War, mass transit under public man-
agement "was able to distinguish operating expenses (i.e., salaries, fuel, routine
maintenance) from capital expenses (i.e., replacement of rolling stock, construc-
tion of maintenance facilities)." CUDAry, supra note 1, at 181. While the former
were to be met from farebox income, the latter "generally were met from other
public revenues," and the debt was "simply absorbed into the larger municipal
fiscal apparatus." Id.
109 Tim Jones, Greyhound Cuts Leave Many Adrift, CHi. TRIB., Oct. 30, 2005, at
C27.
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Obviously, socialist practice should not dictate capitalist policy,
but the socialist procedure is some indicator of the force of pub-
lic demand for cheap transportation.
The strength of consumer or public demand can powerfully
affect the pricing of such crucial necessities as mass transporta-
tion. Similarly, resistance to high business fares in recent years
has broken the airlines' favorite fare structure. As the public
develops a sense of entitlement to transportation as essential to
survival in a modern economy, it acquires a resistance to prices
that are beyond the reach of the most disadvantaged and impe-
cunious. 110 Call this resistance political, if you will;''' it is a resis-
tance that can powerfully affect commercial relations." 2 The
airline entrepreneurs of today may be like the street railway and
interurban tycoons of a bygone era, who were able to extract a
profit from their transportation enterprises for a while but who
eventually succumbed to public ownership or its equivalent."'
To the extent that airline travel becomes democratized-that is,
available to almost the entire population regardless of income
or status-the more likely it is to follow in the path of other
forms of mass transit.
Of course, air travel has not for the last twenty-six years been
price-controlled like most of the earlier forms of mass transit,
and this fact may suggest a different adjustment to deficits. The
earlier types of mass transportation passed out of private owner-
ship when public authority would not allow fares to be main-
tained at, or raised to, a compensatory level. Airline fares are
unregulated, so they presumably will follow a variant of this sce-
nario. The likely path of the airlines is for them to receive peri-
odic public subsidies under various guises as red ink proliferates
rather than to descend at an early point into public owernship
(although that may be their eventual fate). Once the public is
addicted to bargain fares (and this is the case today) it seems
unlikely that the industry will seek or the government permit
necessary increases. Subsidies like the ones instituted after Sep-
HO" See Randy Kennedy, The Nation: On New York's Mass Transit, Pay More as You
Go, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2002, § 4, at 3 (stating that when mass transit systems
were taken over by cities, "fares often held steady for decades" because "mass
transit was an efficient way to move poeple around and that making it affordable
was good public policy").
"I See id. (stating that raising mass transit fares could be "political suicide").
112 See Air Transport Ass'n Statement, supra note 17, at 22.
H3 The transfer of public mass transportation was effected only when private
owners could not afford to bear the costs of replacing old and outmoded equip-
ment. See CUDARY, supra note 1, at 181.
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tember 11 (with some regulatory surveillance) are more likely,
and this will be the end of airlines as ordinary commercial enter-
prises (although, of course, hidden subsidies abound in other
sectors of the economy). The pressure for subsidized fares (in
some form) will prevail in the long run. This, of course, would
be a reversion to the early days of aviation when subsidies re-
lated to carriage of mail were a major source of revenue to air-
lines. Nor would subsidization (hidden or overt) put an end to
competition, which would continue, though with a less likely
culmination in bankruptcy.
The most obvious objection to this line of argument is to cite
the example of Southwest and ask, "Why can't all the other air-
lines do what Southwest has done and operate profitably over
time?" There is little doubt that the management of Southwest
has outshone all of its competition over a very extended period,
and the policies of Southwest would be models for others to em-
ulate. But can the entire airline system of the country success-
fully follow the Southwest pattern? This is doubtful because one
of Southwest's most important policies has been to be very care-
ful where and how it undertakes service. It has undertaken ser-
vice only on those routes where, for one reason or another, it
thought that it could compete successfully.' 14 And it has been
careful about the number of flights it has undertaken in servic-
ing a particular route.' 15 It has essentially been a cream-skim-
mer or cherry-picker, not offering universal service, and this has
been fundamental to its success. To serve the entire country-
good routes and bad, like United, American and Delta-is not
nearly as likely to be as profitable. A closely related considera-
tion involves the use of hub-and-spoke routing as opposed to
Southwest's point-to-point scheme. Hub-and-spoke is a more ef-
ficient way of providing universal service, but Southwest's ap-
proach works very well for its more limited purposes. Thus, the
example of Southwest-heartening as it has been (and a model
to be emulated)-cannot serve as a paradigm for an airline sys-
114 As Herb Kelleher has remarked, "We have a limited number of planes and
we can make X number of dollars in one city and Y in another .... We have a
formula for that ... usually accurate to 5 percent. If the formula says we will do
substantially better here than there, we select that city." Richard M. Weintraub,
Herb Kelleher Has Done It His Way: For Southwest's Flamboyant Chief, Success Brings
Satisfaction, Wealth, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1993, at H16.
115 See Maynard, Airport Haves and Have-Nots, supra note 63 ("But even South-
west has to be careful in choosing new destinations, and in deciding how many
flights to offer, because it must fill 15 to 25 flights a day to and from any destina-
tion for the route to make money.").
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tern purporting to provide something resembling universal
service.
Nor does the anticipation of noncompensatory operations
and subsidies eliminate the prospect of more entrepreneurial
airlines-innovative and highly profitable-like Southwest, Jet
Blue and Ryanair (in Europe). There will always be room for
"niche" airlines, providing good service at low prices and earn-
ing profits better than the industry average. These will always be
characterized by "cream-skimming" and will not be paradigms
for the system as a whole-just as charter operators make money
while the bus business in general is either a drain on the public
treasury or ekes out a bare living. So there will always be room
for the exceptional and for the highly focused, but this prospect
does not essentially alter what may lie ahead for the bulk of the
airlines.
VII. CONCLUSION
Currently there seems to be more concern about whether the
airline industry as a whole can return to profitable operation
and remain generally profitable in the future than about the
many other problems relating to airlines that have arisen from
time to time. The author belongs to the school that believes the
present structure of the industry cannot survive unless profitable
operation can be restored. Given the belief that private compa-
nies surviving on earned revenue must provide the service, a fail-
ure to return the air travel system to profitable operation will
deal a fatal blow to the public interest in an efficient air trans-
portation system.
An exploration of the economics of the industry reveals a be-
lief that competition there tends to be so vigorous that some
observers have described it as "excessive"-that is, tending to
drive prices below costs, resulting in deficit operations. The
main support for this view, which, of course, finds no founda-
tion in orthodox economic analysis, is in the history of the in-
dustry. Before the institution of federal regulation in 1938,
there was a continuing record of loss by air carriers, and, at that
time, the idea of excessive competition was widely accepted. Of
course, air travel was then in its infancy, so the financial record
may not have relevance to current conditions. However, the fi-
nancial record since deregulation in 1978 again shows a cumula-
tive deficit of airline operations over the years. Sometimes the
industry showed good profits, but these were offset by losses at
other times. The only airline to prove consistently profitable
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over the years has been Southwest, whose management has been
unmatched but whose strategy involves cream-skimming-mak-
ing Southwest a questionable model for emulation by the system
as a whole.
As a remedy for whatever ails the system, some observers have
advocated imposition of a full-blown pattern of regulation like
that in place from 1938 to 1978. But this would probably result
in significantly higher fares and in an inflexible fare structure
and, as a remedy, might be worse than whatever ails the system
now. A less comprehensive scheme of regulation might seek to
limit the total number of aircraft in use at any particular time (a
limitation on the supply of air travel). One question would be
whether this approach could be confined in a practical way to
overall supply. It is possible that such a limitation could be es-
tablished by agreement (with antitrust exemption) as during the
era of regulation. Experience during the period of regulation
with agreements among airlines, subject to regulatory approval,
to limit capacity might provide a basis for this approach.
If excessive competition is at the root of the problem, this Ar-
ticle suggests, as a lesser intervention in the market, experimen-
tation with procedures for setting and announcing fares. There
might be a requirement that changes in fares be filed publicly
with a government agency and not put into effect for a period of
time (perhaps, thirty days). Whether this would have a signifi-
cant effect in causing prices to remain at or above costs is un-
known, but only experience would provide an answer. Such a
procedure might encourage more rational pricing, which would
not detract from efficient results in the long run but might
avoid underpricing as a short-term response to competition.
Another approach to the problem of persistent deficits is sim-
ply to recognize that air travel as a form of mass transportation is
not destined to be profitable in the long run. Deregulation,
with its introduction of heavily discounted fares, has helped to
make travel by air a mass phenomenon, available to the public
without distinction as to class or level of income. As a form of
mass transportation, air travel will feel the powerful public resis-
tance to fare increases in the interest of profitability. Like bus,
train, and other mass transit before it, air travel will be increas-
ingly unlikely to yield a profit. Like these other forms of mass
transportation, air travel on the whole may survive only with
public support and subsidies of a nature yet to be determined.
The essential fact is that air travel over the years has been unable
to produce a consistent profit. The burden is on those who
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would continue with the present system unmodified to show
how the consistent problem of unprofitability can be overcome.
The basic problem is a refusal to recognize the fundamental
nature of the forces operating to deny profitability. Now that air
travel has been made available to almost all of society at bargain
prices, will society permit the sort of pricing needed to eliminate
deficits? Or will society permit the persistent lowering of labor
standards (in bankruptcy) in pursuit of solvency? Both of these
possible avenues are blind alleys, and public subsidy is a more
likely remedy for losses.
I4LAS. It*
